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Abstract: In this paper we demonstrate that intra-industry trade (or FDI) between identical
countries could  produce the observed deterioration in the relative wages of unskilled
workers.  This involves a model of North-North integration through either increased trade
flows or increased MNE-based production.  Our motivation in this regard is arguments to
the effect that trade cannot be responsible for the observed labour market trends because
trade with developing countries is quantitatively too small to have significant labour market
effects.   We also introduce a relatively unexploited class of model that possesses attractive
properties with respect to the explicit incorporation of firm-theoretic considerations in trade
models.
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
Since the emergence in the 1980s, in virtually all industrial countries, of increasingly unequal
returns to labour market participation between skilled and unskilled labour (however defined),
there has been an understandable increase in research seeking to evaluate plausible
explanations of this phenomenon.  One of the primary, though highly controversial, suspects
in this literature has been international trade.  For the great majority of the research on the link
between trade and wages, the logic of the argument is straightforwardly represented by the
Stolper-Samuelson theorem, and the source of the problem is seen, more-or-less explicitly, to
be trade with developing countries.  One of the most compelling arguments against the
plausibility of Stolper-Samuelson arguments is that trade with developing countries
constitutes too small a share of OECD economic activity to generate effects of the magnitude
observed in the 1980s.  In this paper, we reexamine the link between trade and wages in a
model of intra-industry trade between identical countries–i.e. the sort of trade that makes up
the majority of trade in OECD countries.
While it is certainly true that the great majority of research on the trade-wages link is
organized more-or-less explicitly in Heckscher-Ohlin terms, it is certainly not the case that
this is the first paper to adapt a framework based on imperfect competition to the study of this
question.  While lacking general equilibrium foundations, a number of labour economists
have developed models in which firms and unions bargain over imperfectly competitive rents
which are themselves affected by the terms of international competition. Our approach, which
is general equilibrium, is very close to the recent on the effect of multinationalization on
relative factor-returns.
We have two goals in this paper.  First, starting from a model that exhibits basic intra-industry
externalities (along the line of the specialization and monopolistic competition literature), our
basic goal is to demonstrate that, at least as a matter of logic, there is no reason why intra-
industry trade, between identical countries, could not produce the observed deterioration in
the relative wages of unskilled workers.  A secondary objective is to introduce a relatively
unexploited class of model that possesses particularly attractive properties with respect to the
explicit incorporation of firm-theoretic considerations in trade models.
We are motivated in our primary goal by recent arguments to the effect that trade cannot be
responsible for observed labour market trends since the late 1970s because trade with
developing countries is quantitatively too small to have significant labour market effects. It
may be that the relatively small volumes of North-South trade seem unlikely to have
generated the sizable relative wage effects observed in the 1980s.  However, this should not
exonerate trade and FDI from suspicion. The last two decades have seen unprecedented (at
least since the start of the first World War) integration -- through both trade and FDI  -- of the
industrial economies. Such North-North integration is logically consistent with the observed
wage pattern. We show here that growing North-North trade and foreign direct investment
can generate large factor market effects as part of an otherwise virtuous link between
productivity and integration.  Unskilled labor is then left behind as a victim of progress.
1Given the rapid growth in this literature, it is probably not surprising that surveys of this
literature are growing at nearly the same rate as the literature itself.  On labour market conditions
generally, see: Davis (1992), Levy and Murnane (1992), Kosters (1994), Gottschalk and Smeeding
(1997), the papers in the Journal of Economic Perspectives symposium on “Wage Inequality” (1997,
V.11-#2), and the appendix to Gaston and Nelson (1998).  Given our particular concern with the link
between trade and wage inequality, we mention recent surveys of this topic by OECD (1997), Gaston
and Nelson (1998) and Slaughter (1998), as well as the recent volume of papers edited by Collins
(1998).
2Though see Leamer (1998) for a strong objection to the logic of this sort of size based
argument.
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Victims of Progress:  Economic Integration, 
Specialization, and Wages for Unskilled Labor
Since the emergence in the 1980s, in virtually all industrial countries, of increasingly unequal
returns to labour market participation between skilled and unskilled labour (however defined), there has
been an understandable increase in research seeking to evaluate plausible explanations of this
phenomenon.1  One of the primary, though highly controversial, suspects in this literature has been
international trade.  For the great majority of the research on the link between trade and wages, the
logic of the argument is straightforwardly represented by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, and the
source of the problem is seen, more-or-less explicitly, to be trade with developing countries.  One of
the most compelling arguments against the plausibility of Stolper-Samuelson arguments is that trade with
developing countries constitutes too small a share of OECD economic activity to generate effects of the
magnitude observed in the 1980s.2  In this paper, we reexamine the link between trade and wages in a
model of intra-industry trade between identical countries–i.e. the sort of trade that makes up the
majority of trade in OECD countries.
3Ethier (1982), in particular, provides a careful analysis of Stolper-Samuelson-like effects in the
context of his classic division of labour model.  Our paper (Francois and Nelson, 1998) whose
framework this paper extends is basically a graphical gloss on Ethier’s paper.
4Bhagwati and Dehejia (1994) sketch a model with similar concerns.
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While it is certainly true that the great majority of research on the trade-wages link is organized
more-or-less explicitly in Heckscher-Ohlin terms, it is certainly not the case that this is the first paper to
adapt a framework based on imperfect competition to the study of this question.  While lacking general
equilibrium foundations, a number of labour economists have developed models in which firms and
unions bargain over imperfectly competitive rents which are themselves affected by the terms of
international competition (Abowd and Lemieux, 1991; Freeman and Katz, 1991; Borjas and Ramey,
1994, 1995; Gaston and Trefler, 1995).  Since we will be developing a general equilibrium analysis,
more directly relevant work can be found in the early developments of the monopolistic competition
model which examined income distribution effects–e.g. Krugman (1981) and Ethier (1982)–and our
analysis is very much in this tradition.3  A very closely related body of research considers the effect of
multinationalization on relative wages.  Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1997) develop a model of North-
South division of labour in a single industry in which capital mobility (i.e. the multinational division of
labour) can raise the relative wage of skilled labour in both countries.4  Much more closely related to
the model developed here are papers by Markusen and Venables (1996a, 1997) on the effects of
North-North multinationalization on relative factor-returns.
In the next section, we develop a model of increasing returns due to specialization at the plant
level, which we then embed in a two-factor × two-good general equilibrium structure.  In this
framework we consider two types of globalisation: international trade and multi-nationalisation. 
5Buchanan and Yoon (1994) collect a number of key papers from both the shadowy early
period (including the relevant passage from Smith, and Young’s classic essay) and the current
emergence as a core element of both micro and macroeconomic research.  Krugman’s (1995) Ohlin
Lectures are a fascinating presentation of the relationship between ideas and models in this area.
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Because the structure is a bit unusual, we develop it in some detail.  However, once the structure has
been presented, we are able to take advantage of the graphical apparatus developed in Francois and
Nelson (1998) to present our main results on globalisation and relative returns to skilled versus
unskilled labour quite quickly.
I. Production and General Equilibrium under Specialization Economies
While the notion that the division of labour has both micro and macroeconomic foundations goes back
at least to Adam Smith, and most clearly to Allyn Young, it lived a sort of shadowy existence until the
development of a number of simple formalizations in the early 1980s permitted direct introduction of
these ideas into the main corpus of economic theory.5  One of the fundamental barriers to formalization
lay in the difficulty of treating the macroeconomic aspect of division of labour seriously in a tractable
framework.  The macroeconomic aspect of the analysis rests on the recognition that an increasing
division of labour involves a fundamental transformation of the technology (increasing
“roundaboutness”) at the level of the economy as a whole.  In addition, there is the effect, beautifully
summarized by Marshall (1890) in terms of “... the part which nature plays in production shows a
tendency to diminishing return, the part which man plays shows a tendency to increasing return”.  That
is, as we are now well aware, any serious treatment of the macroeconomic aspects of the division of
labour leads fairly directly to increasing returns and, thus, to nonconvexities in the feasible set.
6This aspect of the model was also essential to the model of Spence (1976) and Dixit-Stiglitz
(1977).  In the SDS model these are final consumption goods, while in the Ethier model they are
producer goods.
7In addition to Ethier’s original analysis, see Markusen (1990) and Francois and Nelson (1998)
for treatments that stress the division of labour/macroeconomic increasing returns aspects of the Ethier
model.  This property of the Ethier model also led to its adoption as the theoretical basis of one of the
fundamental models of endogenous growth (e.g. Romer, 1987).
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The key step in formalizing these essential notions was Wilfred Ethier’s (1982) insight that the
Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition could be reinterpreted as a model of the
division of labour.  In addition to a perfectly competitive, constant returns to scale sector, the Ethier
model has a sector which uses specialized inputs to produce a final consumption good.  Allyn Young-
like roundaboutness is represented by the fact that productivity in this sector is increasing in the variety
of such inputs.  On the other hand, the division of labour among producers of specialized inputs is
limited by increasing returns and fixed resources.6  As was clear from the start of this literature, this
model was characterized by macroeconomic increasing returns as well as the microeconomic increasing
returns at the level of specialized inputs.7
An interesting alternative representation of the division of labour was suggested by Edwards
and Starr (1987) in their formalization of Adam Smith’s pin factory example.  The Edwards-Starr
model represents an increasing division of labour in terms of a family of production functions indexed by
the number of distinct tasks into which the production process is divided.  Assuming one class of
labour, that can be allocated to any of v tasks, Edwards and Starr give the firm’s production function
as:
8 Specifically, Edwards and Starr assume that:   It is also assumed that
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For any intensity of division of labour (denoted by v, the number of distinct tasks), the relevant
production function is made up of a Cobb-Douglas kernel and a productivity parameter representing
increased productivity with an increased division of labour.8  The Edwards-Starr analysis is, however,
essentially microeconomic.  The authors were interested in exploring Smith’s insight that since labour
comes embodied in discrete lumps (i.e. people), and there are costs of transferring people between
jobs, “the division of labour is limited by the extent of the market”.
Francois (1990a and b) makes the step to a macroeconomic analysis by introducing a labour
constraint in a one-sector model of the Edwards-Starr variety to analyze growth (1990a) and trade
(1990b).  In making the move to a tractable macroeconomic model, that can be analyzed with standard
formal methods, Francois drops the emphasis on lumpy labour in favor of infinitely divisible labour. 
Without some additional constraint, this would imply an infinitely intensive division of labour.  As with
Edwards and Starr, this additional constraint emerges from firm-theoretic considerations, but where
Edwards and Starr follow Smith in focusing on shop floor production considerations, Francois adopts a
more modern firm-theoretic approach based on the increasing costs of managing a more intensive
division of labour.  In this section we extend Francois’ framework to a two sector economy.
9That is, X = g(S,L), where g(·) is linear homogeneous, twice differentiable, and strictly
concave.
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Suppose that the economy is endowed with skilled (S) and unskilled (L) labour, which is used
to produce two final consumption goods: differentiated manufactures (M); and a standardized good (X). 
Good X is produced from S and L according to a standard neoclassical production function.9  Since
good X is completely standard, we focus on developing the production of M, which is characterized by
increasing returns due to specialization at the plant level, along the lines spelled out in Francois (1990b). 
We assume that a range of techniques are available and indexed by v.  Increasing the degree of
specialization within a plant (choosing a higher v) increases the productivity of direct labor, but is
subject to rising indirect (i.e. skilled) labor costs related to coordination, control, technical process
management, etc.  Thus, following Edwards and Starr, direct production of variety j of manufactures is
specified as follows:
Where mj is the output of variety j in the plant,  Li represents direct labor employed in activity v, and
the second equality is derived by setting (where ) and .b dv v= d > 1 a iv v= 1/
Increased specialization comes at the expense of increased skilled labor requirements as
follows:
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where 1 >  > 0.  Equation (2) states that skilled labor requirements increase linearly with the degreey
of specialization–holding scale (i.e. level of output) constant.  They also increase with scale, but at a
decreasing rate for a given degree of specialization.  Combined, equations (1) and (2) imply an optimal
degree of specialization that increases with the level of output, holding factor prices constant.  This can
be generalized in terms of the set of envelope curves containing the set of efficient techniques for a given
level of output mj:
where  and 1 >  > 0.  From equation (3), plant-level production is
( )x y d
d
:
( )
=
+ -1 1
x
characterized by increasing returns to scale, while increased output, at a given level of relative labor
costs, will be characterized by increased specialization within the plant.  In particular, the optimal
degree of specialization v* will be given by:
where wL designates the wage of unskilled (i.e. direct) labor, and ws designates the wage of skilled (i.e.
indirect) labor.
Given equation (4), variable production costs at the plant level will be as follows:
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Plant level costs are characterized by scale economies and a constant cost-disadvantage ratio. For
convenience, we define factor bundles b, produced subject to constant returns to scale and normalized
so that they have a price equal to the factor price index component of equation (5).
Finally, to round out the production side of the m sector, we assume that each variety requires a fixed
cost (also measured in units of b) q.
We will be dealing with two alternative forms of globalisation.  The first involves trade with
single plant firms, the other involves multi-plant firms and hence an equilibrium where trade is replaced
by multinational enterprises (MNEs).  For a given product mix, whether we observe a trade or MNE
equilibrium will depend on the difference between trading costs (designated ) and the costt
disadvantage from operating a second plant in the host country.  For reasons that will become clear, we
assume that MNEs both forego potential scale economies when they operate multiple plants, and also
incur higher costs with production in the host country, designated a.  In formal terms, we have:
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In writing equations (8) and (9), we have taken advantage of the assumption (introduced explicitly
below) that we are working with a symmetric equilibrium, such that , and where af f1 2( ) ( )× = ×
superscript designates country 1 or country 2.
In the case of the trade equilibrium, equation (8) actually describes ex-factory costs.  We also
assume a trading cost (modelled Samuelson iceberg fashion) of b.  Combined with an assumption of
average cost pricing, this yields the following delivered average cost pricing equations in the trade
equilibrium.
At the subutility level for good m, we assume CES-type preferences for variety:
From equation (11), the combination of the number of available varieties n in equilibrium, and  the
elasticity of substitution between varieties  will determine the elasticity of demand   for eachs e j
10 Formally, zero profits and monopoly pricing require that 1/ = CDR, where CDR=1-e
MC/AC, and MC and AC are marginal and average cost.  This condition is met in the present model,
in the small group case, when firm level output mj and n increase or fall in tandem.  In the small group
case, the elasticity of demand equals , where  is a quantity weighted measure ofs x s+ -( )1 x
market share.
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variety.  In the large group case, this converges to .s
We leave it to the reader to verify that, in the large group trade equilibria, characterized by single plant
firms, the level of output per firm will be fixed, with market expansion leading to pure variety gains for
consumers.  In the small group case, which will be emphasized here, we will see an expansion of both
scale and variety as more resources are devoted to m production.10
To complete our general equilibrium system, we make the following three assumptions.  First,
upper-tier preferences are identical and linear homogenous. Second, the transformation function
between X and b is strictly concave.  Third, the b sector is relatively skill-intensive.
The third assumption, as embodied in equation (15), can be backed out of a Heckscher-Ohlin
production structure for bundles and X, or alternatively out of a specific factors framework, with skilled
labor being m specific and unskilled labor being employable in both the m and X sectors.
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II. The integrated (or autarky) equilibrium
Consider next the general equilibrium properties of the economy outlined above.  We start with
the integrated or autarky equilibrium, and in particular with the transformation from factor bundles b to
the composite manufactured good M.  In the M sector, the monopolistically competitive equilibrium will
involve versions of equations (8), (10),(11), and (12), along with the monopoly pricing and full
employment rules below:
With considerable manipulation, the relationship between the number of bundles b and the composite
good M under these conditions can be shown to be the following: 
)/( ii qmbn +=
z (17)
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Representative plots of this relationship, from numerical computations, are presented in the appendix. 
The economically relevant equilibrium sets defined by equation (18) are characterized by positive first
and second derivatives.  We are therefore able to represent the economy as in Figure 1.  In the lower
left quadrant, equation (14) defines the transformation frontier between bundles (b) and X.  The lower
right quadrant is an identity map taking X from the lower left to the upper right quadrant.  The
function  in the upper left quadrant represents the equilibrium relationship between bundlesM b= Q( )
11 Note that in the large group case, we fix mj, so that we can scale b such that m = b.
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and the subutility composite good M.  Given specialization externalities, the term captures the¢¢ >Q 0
benefits of these externalities on the average contribution of bundles b to the composite M.11  (In the
standard  large group Ethier model, this follows purely from variety effects, while in the present case,
this follows from a mix of increased scale and variety.)  The mapping, through the function , from bQ
to M then allows us to draw the frontier in the upper right quadrant.  Consumption, given homothetic
upper-tier preferences, will be at some point like e0 , with a non-tangency between the private and
social product transformation rates.  Finally, equation (15) is represented in the fifth quadrant.
3.A. Economic integration through reduction in trading costs
Now that we have established the basic model, we proceed to our analysis of the effect of
globalisation on the relative wages of unskilled workers.  In this section we consider the effect of
international trade, while the next section takes up foreign direct investment.  To keep the analysis
simple, we work with the completely symmetric case.  That is, countries have identical endowments,
technologies, and preferences.  Samuelson’s angel simply divides the integrated equilibrium represented
above by allocating factors in equal quantities between the two economies.  With costly trade, both
economies will look qualitatively like that in figure 1, but since the  function is determined byQ
conditions in both countries, as we introduce trading costs, there will be a downward shift in the Q
function as, along the lines of Krugman’s (1980) initial discussion of home market effects, we observe a
substitution from foreign to home varieties. 
12There is a whole set of issues related to stability and the location of industry as we move away
from symmetric equilibria.  This is the subject of the new geography literature.  We reserve discussion
of stability until a later subsection of the paper.
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The relationship between trading costs  and the  function is represented in Figure 2.  (Itst Q
derivation is discussed in the appendix).  In the figure we have mapped trading costs on the z-axis,
bundles on the y-axis, and M on the vertical axis.  As we move along the z-axis, each slice of the
surface represents a -dependant  function.t Q
Now, from an equilibrium with trading costs, consider the impact of a reduction in trading costs. 
We represent this process in Figure3.  First, we will have an upward shift in the function as tradingQ
costs fall, and a consequent shift in the MX frontier.12
Consumers will perceive a gain in the efficiency with which the economy produces M.  If
substitution effects dominate, and budget shares are shifted toward m production, we will observe the
following: an increased degree of specialization at the firm level, with consequent productivity gains, an
increase in skilled wages relative to unskilled wages, and an increase in real national income (choosing
the composite U as the numeraire).  Whether or not unskilled labor gains in real terms, even as it loses
in relative terms, will depend on the strength of combined variety and scale effects in the m sector.
A considerable body of empirical research finds that foreign direct investment is closely
associated with the relative wage effects driving the trade and wages literature.  Thus, the next section
considers a simple extension of our model to the case of multinational firms.
13The papers collected in Machlup, Salant, and Tarshis (1972) are a fair sample of this line of
research.
14Caves (1982) presents a very good survey of the research that makes up the second wave. 
One should also mention John Dunning’s highly influential attempt to synthesize the two strands of the
second wave.  See Dunning (1981) for a representative sample of this work.
15However, as an example of just how useful a first step this is, see Jones and Dei’s (1983)
outstanding graphical exposition and extension of the Caves-Amano-Falvey analysis.
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3.B. Economic integration through reduction in FDI costs for MNEs
Theoretical research on foreign direct investment (FDI) has developed in three waves.  In the first, FDI
was analyzed in terms of capital arbitrage.13  The second wave was initiated by Steven Hymer’s (1960)
dissertation and focused on firm-theoretic analysis in an essentially partial equilibrium framework.  This
wave was characterized by two distinct strands, one followed Hymer in focusing on market power
considerations, while the other adopted the Coase-Arrow-Williamson internalization approach.14  The
most recent wave attempts to incorporate the firm-theoretic insights of the second wave into a trade-
theoretic general equilibrium framework.  The first attempts of this sort follow a suggestion by Caves
(1971) in treating the multinational enterprise (MNE) as an agent of international arbitrage of firm-
specific capital in an essentially perfectly competitive environment.  While this was a useful first step, this
approach does not really come to grips with the implications of the firm-theoretic approach.15  Since the
mid-1980s a number of scholars have begun to build firm-theoretic features into monopolistic
competition models that begin to incorporate the full range of considerations in all the previous research
on FDI.
This most recent trend begins with important papers by Helpman (1984, 1985) and Markusen
(1984), who model the production and trade decisions of multinational firms that produce according to
-16-
a technology with both firm and plant specific fixed costs.  Helpman develops a model of vertical
integration, in which headquarters activities (i.e. firm-specific fixed costs) are concentrated in the home
country while production (characterized by plant-specific fixed costs) are concentrated abroad.  For
Helpman, MNEs exist to take advantage of international differences in factor-prices since headquarters
and production activities use factors in different proportions.  Markusen’s model of headquarters
activity is somewhat different, with the firm-specific activity a non-rival input to all plants in the firm. 
Because there are decreasing costs in the headquarters activity, it is concentrated in one country, while
national markets are served by local production branches.  Where the Helpman (1984) model is
essentially a model of international vertical multinationalization, Markusen’s model is one of horizontal
multinationalization.  In the context of this model, Markusen shows that countries which are symmetric
in autarky can end up with asymmetric outcomes.  In particular, Markusen examines the effect of
globalisation on relative returns to production in the two countries.
The approach we adopt in this paper is very close to that in Markusen (1984), though the
model of firm activity is distinct.  We assume the existence of a MNE and represent increased
globalisation as a reduction in the cost of multinational production. Specifically, we assume that equation
(9) is less than equation (8) for relevant equilibria, or alternatively that a and foregone scale economies
are low relative to  in the relevant range of equilibria.  From such an equilibrium (which may again bet
represented as in Figure 3), the qualitative implications of a decline in a are comparable to those for a
decline in .  As in the case of increased trade-based economic integration, with increased MNE-t
based integration we will again observe an improvement in sectoral efficiency as measured by the Q
function, and depending on substitution effects, the following coincident events: an increased degree of
16 Formally, the stability of an equilibria depends on whether  or < k'/k.¢¢ ¢ >g g/ 0
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specialization at the firm level, with consequent productivity gains, an increase in skilled wages relative
to unskilled wages, and an increase in real national income (choosing the composite U as the
numeraire).  Whether or not unskilled labor gains in real terms, even as it loses in relative terms, will
again depend on the strength of combined variety and scale effects in the m sector.
3.C. Economic integration, stability, and dynamic adjustment
Finally, we examine another, related set of implications from falling trading costs, improved
efficiency of MNE production, and the relative wages of unskilled labor.  We have so far limited
ourselves to regions, in the upper right quadrant of Figure 3, characterized by well-behaved (at least
locally) equilibria.  From Francois and Nelson (1998), we know that, in the mapping in the upper right
quadrant, we will have stable and unstable equilibria, with relative stability depending on the curvature
of the  and  functions.16  In terms of Figure 4 this means that, with increased integration, the shiftg Q
in equilibria may not be local.  In particular, if we are shifted into an unstable region, then the initial shift
by consumers of expenditure (and hence resource) into m production leads to increases in scale effects
(measured by k ') that will, at least locally, outweigh the relative curvature of the  function.  The resultg
will be a potentially large non-local shift in resources into m production following a relatively mild shock
to the productivity of the m sector, abetted either by reduced trading costs, or by increased efficiency
of MNE production.  In either event, we may then expect an adjustment process that appears to
involve productivity gains in the m sector, rising relative wages for skilled labor, falling prices for M (due
-18-
to scale effects and variety effects), and an increasing volume of either international trade or MNE
activity.
4. Conclusions
This paper has had two goals.  The first has been simply to note that, at least as a matter of
logic, there is no reason why intra-industry trade, between identical countries, could not produce the
observed deterioration in the relative wages of unskilled workers.  We were motivated in this concern
by some arguments to the effect that trade cannot be responsible for observed labour market trends
since the late 1970s because trade with developing countries is quantitatively too small to have
significant labour market effects. North-North integration, through trade or foreign investment, is
logically consistent with such a wage pattern.  We note in passing that the last two decades have seen
unprecedented (at least since the start of the first World War) integration -- through both trade and FDI 
-- of the industrial economies. Our second goal has been to introduce a relatively unexploited class of
model that possesses particularly attractive properties with respect to the explicit incorporation of firm-
theoretic considerations in trade models.
The literature on trade and labor markets has focused primarily on mechanisms of the Stolper-
Samuelson sort and, thus, at least implicitly, on North-South trade. As we noted in the introduction, the
relatively small volumes of North-South trade seem unlikely to have generated the sizable relative wage
effects observed in the 1980s.  In this paper we have shown that growing North-North trade and
foreign direct investment can generate large factor market effects as part of an otherwise virtuous link
between productivity and integration.  Unskilled labor is left as a victim of progress.
-19-
This paper has also sketched a simple model with rudimentary firm structure and used the
model to evaluate the implications of international trade and foreign direct investment under fixed
market structures.  In this we follow the earlier development of models with alternative firm theoretic
foundations by Helpman (1984, 1985) and Markusen (1984).  In addition, we have argued that models
of the Edwards-Starr class, especially as adapted for macroeconomic analysis, provide a particularly
promising framework for considering the integration of FDI in trade theoretic models.  However, the
analysis presented here is a very small first step.  A considerably larger step is taken in an extraordinary
series of papers by Ethier (1986), Horstmann and Markusen (1992), Markusen and Venables
(1996a,b,c, 1997, 1998), and Brainard (1993) that seek to endogenize multinationality itself.  The
programme, developed in greatest detail by Markusen and Venables, of integrating firm-theoretic
considerations with trade theoretic considerations in a general equilibrium theoretical framework strikes
us as both interesting and important.
-20-
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Appendix:
In this appendix we discuss the properties of the Theta function for the model.  The Theta
function maps the transformation of factor bundles into composite goods for the sector
subject to scale economies from specialization.
The Integrated economy :
The basic mapping for the integrated/autarky economy depends on the following
relationships:
costs:
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elasticity of demand:
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average cost pricing:
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CES aggregator for a symmetric equilibrium:
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In the above equations, s>1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties, 1>z>0
captures scale effects, qi is a measure of fixed costs (in units of factor bundles), Pb is the
price of factor bundles B, Pi  is the (identical) price of variety i, mi is the quantity supplied
of variety i, and n is the number of identically sized firms.
From these relationships, we can derive the following relationship between the resource
allocation to the M sector (measured in units of b) and the M itself, M=Q(b).
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From computational analysis, only one of these relationships is relevant for most
parameter value, with a mapping from B to M as illustrated below in Figure A.1 (for s=3,
z=0.85, qi=1).  A case of both mappings being relevant is illustrated in Figure A..2 (for
s=2, z=0.5, qi=1).  A case where both exist, but only one is relevant, is mapped in Figure
A.3  ( for s=1.5, z=0.5, qi=1).  In the paper itself, we work with unique positive
mappings, like those in Figures A.1 and A.3).  Figure 2 in the text is based on Figure A.1,
for a range of trading costs.
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